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The extent and nature of business financing of parties is an important feature of 
political finance.  Britain’s transparent and permissive regulatory system provides an 
excellent opportunity to study business financing of parties.  Business donations have 
been very important to the Conservative party over the last decade, and of only 
marginal importance to Labour.  Unlike other Conservative contributors, business 
donors are more likely to contribute when the party is popular.  In contrast to the 
previous period of Conservative government, the biggest British businesses tended to 
abstain from political finance under New Labour.  However, their bias towards the 
Conservatives is affected by the party’s popularity and the closeness of an election.  
Britain shares the political importance of business financing of parties and its mixture 
of ideological and pragmatic motivations with other liberal market economies.  
However, in Britain the bias towards the right is much stronger and the role of big 
business more marginal. 
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Britain now generates more and better information about political finance than almost 
any other country.  Nonetheless, the data created by the Political Parties Elections and 
Referendums Act has not inspired a new wave of analysis.  Strangely, previous 
quantitative studies relate to the earlier period when figures were much more difficult 
to obtain (Bond 2007; Fisher 1992; Fisher 2000; Mitchell and Bretting 1993).  
Writing on the subject tends to emphasise aggregate figures, critique of the legal and 
administrative system, and the recapitulation of media controversies.  In doing so, the 
literature assumes a party-centred approach.  This style of research has shown its 
worth, but, clearly, political fundraising involves donors as well as donees.  This 
article exploits the potential of UK official data to shed light on the motivations of 
business donors (Scarrow 2006).  Business money is the most controversial source of 
political finance.  Indeed, business financing of political parties always generates a 
tensions between votes (the currency of democracy) and pounds (the currency of 
capitalism) (Lindblom 1977: 189-200; Vogel 1996). 
 
The political context since official disclosure began in 2001 provides several 
opportunities.  This was the era of New Labour.  Tony Blair went as far as asserting 
that Labour was the “natural party of business” (Coen and Grant 2006: 17). Was 
business sufficiently convinced to begin offering financial support to the Labour 
party?  Labour’s triumph was the Conservatives’ rout and the pre-Cameron period 
represents the darkest era in the history of the post-war Conservative party (Bale 
2009: 224).  By contrast, in recent years, Labour, under both Blair and Brown, had 
become a tired party that seemed to have spent too long in government.  In other 
words, the popularity of the parties, and their prospects of controlling government, 
varied hugely in this period.  This enables us to separate business sympathy towards 
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the Conservative party from business recognition that the Conservatives have tended 
to win British elections.  As well as these political conditions, the legislation itself is 
likely to have affected behaviour (Scarrow 2007: 202).  Disclosure may well have 
reduced business donations, as firms receive unwelcome publicity and complaints 
from shareholders.  Indeed, disclosure and politics probably interact.  When a 
reforming Australian Labor Party (ALP) introduced disclosure in the 1980s, it began 
writing to conservative donor businesses asking that they also contribute to the ALP 
(Gordon and Ceresa: 1995).  New Labour was perhaps more subtle, but businesses 
may have decided that donations to Labour were a cheap insurance against political 
risks from one of the world’s most powerful executives.  This article links such 
questions in a comparative framework.  I look at the contribution rate and whether 
donations have been pragmatically or ideologically motivated.  Previous research on 
Australia, Canada, Germany and the United States suggests that contribution rates are 
much higher in liberal market economies.  Also, if such economies are combined with 
an ideologically-structured party system, business financing of parties should display 
both ideological and pragmatic motivations.  The article is organised 
straightforwardly.  In the next section, I introduce the key concepts of pragmatism and 
ideology in political finance.  I then present hypotheses to explain cross-national 
variation.  Then after a discussion of the regulatory, economic and political context of 
the British case, I move on to the empirical core of the paper, which analyses in turn 




Motivations for Business Financing of Political Parties 
 
Business contributions to political parties can be conceived in terms of two general 
motivations: ideological and pragmatic.  Ideological contributions are not likely to 
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survive a cost-benefit analysis because, whatever the possible benefits, it is rational to 
free ride on the contributions of other businesses to the long-term class-wide interest 
(Olson 1971). Ideological contributions are made to the political actors most likely to 
promote capitalism in general, regardless of whether any specific benefits will accrue 
to the contributing firm.  The distribution of ideologically motivated donations should 
be relatively stable over time.  Party ideologies change slowly.  Even if parties tack to 
the left or the right for tactical reasons, it is rare for the left-right ranking of parties to 
change.  By contrast, pragmatic contributions are essentially business decisions, taken 
with the firm’s usual profit-seeking motive. The distribution of pragmatic donations 
should follow short-term changes in the power and popularity of parties.  These two 
motivations may interact in a single decision about the distribution of political 
contributions.  For example, take a firm that has an ideological preference for the 
right.  Under a left-wing government it may be prepared to contribute to the left, 
while also continuing to express its ideological preference by funding the right-wing 
opposition.  Thus, a firm’s distribution of cash to parties is a strategic decision taking 
into account political power and the firm’s ideological position, if it has one.   
 
Social factors also play an important part in business financing of political parties 
(Bond 2004).  However, this can be seen as a mechanism of ideologically or 
pragmatically-motivated giving.  In many countries, pragmatic donations to parties 
occur in the context of low corruption.  In this situation, discrete exchanges such as 
the purchase of policy or even the purchase of access to decision-makers, incurs too 
high a reputational cost on politicians and businesses.  Instead, donations form part of 
a reciprocal exchange.  They help to develop and maintain a relationship with 
politicians, which may, in due course, produce a small but real increase in the 
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probability of successful lobbying (Clawson, Neustadtl and Weller 1998; Gordon 
2005; McMenamin 2012).  Networks are also important in understanding ideological 
donations, but in this case the network precedes the donation.  Many people are 
socialised into an ideological position and even socialised into a close relationship 
with a particular party.  Indeed, the relationship between “public schools”, high 
finance in the City of London and the Conservative Party is a classic example of this 
process. 
 
Businesses and businesspeople are likely to be differently-motivated in making 
financial contributions to political parties (McMenamin 2009: 212-213).  Individuals 
are more likely to make ideological contributions.  In contrast to firms, they do not 
have to justify their decision to shareholders. Individuals can use cash generated by 
business activities to further their political values as opposed to their business 
interests. Of course, rich individuals are also interested in getting richer and may also 
be motivated pragmatically. Individuals are particularly likely to be influenced by 
social position. It is they who actually went to certain schools, frequent certain clubs 
and sit on certain boards. 
 
The incentives facing firms push them towards pragmatic motivations. Most firms are 
explicitly dedicated to making a profit. Therefore, a well-run firm should not be 
tempted to make ideological gestures, even if such gestures are consistent with the 
social positions of the firm’s management and owners.  Publicity imposes a 
reputational cost on a firm and a politician (Grant 1993 144).  Therefore, firms may 
be tempted to route donations through individuals associated with the firm.  In 
aggregate, firms and individuals should behave differently, but, in many instances, 
their motivations may overlap (Bond 2007: 59-60). 
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Truly massive businesses find themselves in a different political situation to other 
firms (Coen 1997, 99; Grant 1993: 87-88).   Their financial resources are so great as 
to be seemingly limitless in the penny-pinching world of political finance.  Cash 
donations, even ones that seem huge to ordinary individuals do not constitute a large, 
or perhaps even a noticeable, cost to big businesses.  Such businesses are much more 
visible than other businesses because of their size and, in many cases, also because of 
the prominence of their brand in everyday life.  This visibility is the real cost of 
financing political parties for big businesses.  It can affect a business in a number of 
ways.  Controversy can damage the firm’s reputation amongst the public.  Donations 
can be costly in this way regardless of the real or perceived motivations behind them.  
In public companies, political donations can lead to unwelcome controversy within 
the firm’s own governance structures.  Donations will probably be more visible to 
politicians than to the general public and the firm’s shareholders.  Ideological 
donations may attract the enmity of one side of politics, while perceived pragmatism 
may attract requests for money, and perhaps even potentially damaging offers of 
benefits, from all political parties.   
 
Large businesses, by virtue of their importance to the economy, possess massive 
structural power.  In contrast to smaller businesses, they do not necessarily need to 
buy the attention of politicians to their particular needs.  However, financial 
contributions may serve to increase their influence yet further.  Visibility imposes a 
potential cost on businesses, but that visibility is much more costly to politicians.  In a 
democracy, politicians need to emphasise that the currency of votes trumps that of 
money.   Thus, visibility places a very significant constraint on benefits that 
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politicians may be willing to award to donor businesses.  Nonetheless, the profits that 
can be gained from even subtle changes in public policy are so massive that there are 
always potential benefits to firms from engagement with the political system. 
 
In the empirical sections of this article, I assess the evidence for ideologically and 
pragmatically-motivated donations amongst businesses in general, very large 
businesses and prominent individuals associated with large businesses. 
 
Explaining cross-national variation 
In liberal market economies, the highly competitive, short-term focus of firms should 
generate substantial demand for private goods that could help firms develop an 
advantage over their rivals.  Pragmatism should be an important motivation for 
business financing of parties and since pragmatism is embedded in the basic profit-
seeking mission of the firm the contribution rate should be high.  The preference for 
less state intervention, and the awareness of the state’s power to disrupt the business 
environment, is likely to engender a widespread awareness of the importance of 
public policy goods to the overall business sector.  This should result in a relatively 
important ideological motivation in business contributions to parties.  However, this 
political effect should interact with the party system.  In a polarised political system, 
the political risk should be greater.  If there is a little difference between parties’ 
economic policies and reputations, the ideological motivation is likely to be marginal.  
Australia and the United States are liberal economies.  There is pragmatic giving to 
the major parties of the left and right along with an ideological bias towards the right 
(McMenamin 2008; Stratmann 2005).  Canada’s traditional governing parties enjoyed 
widespread pragmatic contributions until corporate donations were banned in 2004.  
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The two centrist, brokerage parties were treated remarkably equally by businesses 
(McMenamin 2012).   
 
In a co-ordinated market economy, the most important policies for firms tend to be 
the public goods defined, championed, and, to a substantial extent, actually delivered 
by their business associations.  In this context, the pragmatic motivation for 
contributions to political parties is likely to be very weak.  The combination of 
consensual political institutions and constrained parties means there is a very low risk 
of major policy change from election to election (Iversen 2005: 122-182; Wood 
2001).  So, there is also likely to be low interest in ideological financing of political 
parties.  Since both motivations are undermined by the political economy, the 
contribution rate should be very low.  Germany, the archetypical co-ordinated market 
economy, exemplifies this pattern of business financing of parties (McMenamin 
2012).   
 
 
The British case 
 
The regulation of British political finance has a long history.  The first law on political 
finance dates back to 1883 when the Corrupt and Illegal Practices (Prevention) Act 
introduced a cap on spending at constituency level (Fisher 2009: 305).  Although an 
intervention in private spending, this law expressed a reluctance to acknowledge the 
importance of parties, which was to endure through the twentieth century.  The 
Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act (PPERA) heralded a fundamental 
change in the theory and practice of British political finance regulation.  It instigated 
an impressive level of transparency, a ban on foreign donations and spending limits 
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for the parties.  However, it did not introduce limits on the size or source of domestic 
donations; nor did it introduce substantial state funding.   
 
Britain exhibits all the distinguishing characteristics of a liberal market economy 
(Hall and Soskice 2001: 19-21, 59; Wood 2001).  It has a large stock market, which 
provides the principal means of corporate finance.  Its labour market is flexible and it 
has a generalist education system.  Business associations are weak.  The prime 
minister and cabinet have operated under few constraints, or they did until the 
coalition formed after the 2010 general election.  Firms are isolated from other 
businesses in their sector and under pressure to produce short-term profits.  In this 
business environment, many should seek to use the political system to gain an 
advantage over their competitors.  Moreover, the power of the executive creates a 
potential for costly policy swings.  In this context, the ideology of government matters 
to business and the usual business preference for market rather than state is especially 
appealing.  Britain’s party system has a clear left-right structure, but the advent of 
New Labour reduced polarisation.  Therefore, Britain should have relatively high 
contribution rate and substantial evidence of both pragmatic and ideologically-
motivated contributions.  In the next section, I begin to test these predictions.   
 
Business donations  
 
This section examines donations and loans to the Labour and Conservative parties 
from companies from the 1st of January 2001 until the end of May 2010.  An 
inspection of the registers reveals that almost all business donations are from 
companies.  Donations to officeholders are trivial in comparison to those received by 
the parties themselves.  Indeed, there are very few donations to officeholders once 
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free car parking spaces at airports and fact-finding trips to the Middle East are 
excluded.  Loans are an important part of contemporary British party finance.  I 
analyse them in the appendix and explain why they do not confound conclusions 
drawn from donations.   
 
The data analysed in this section are available at http://www.dcu.ie/~mcmenami. As 
Figure 1 shows, the Conservatives received one quarter of their income from 
companies, but Labour well under five per cent.  The Conservative party, because it 
was in opposition, received considerable public funding (Ewing 2005: 184-185).  If 
the Conservative party had not had either public funding or substantial company 
funding, it would have had a similar income to Labour.  If it had had neither, it would 
have had to do with a much smaller income than the Labour.  Therefore, although it 
cannot be said that companies are the paymasters of the Conservative party, there 
seems to be some potential for them to influence the Conservatives.  By contrast, 
business donations are barely noticeable to the Labour party. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
In the period since 2001, as Figure 2 illustrates, Conservative income from private 
donations has risen fairly gradually, excepting predictable spikes in advance of 
elections (Fisher 2000: 198).  During this time, the popularity of the party has also 
increased, raising the possibility of a relationship between the two.  However, a 
regression analysis controlling for the number of days to the next election, suggests no 
significant relationship between Conservative donations and the average quarterly 
poll value from ICM (Please see Table 1).  The response of donors to the steep 
increase in popularity achieved by David Cameron was, at most, cautious and 
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delayed.  Figure 3, showing company donations to the Conservatives also suggests 
some connection between the party’s popularity and fundraising.  In contrast to 
Labour, this relationship is statistically significant in a regression analysis.  Also, 
there is a larger, if still statistically insignificant relationship, between popularity and 
company donations.  In contrast to general donors, it seems that companies reacted 
immediately and enthusiastically to Cameron’s accession (c.f. Bale 2009: 228).  The 
first two quarters of 2006 matched the two quarters preceding the election of 2010, in 
which, until very late on, most had expected a clear Conservative victory. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Figure 4 does not suggest that popularity affects the Labour party’s ability to raise 
funds.  Interestingly, Labour’s most successful quarter by far was before it lost the 
general election of the 2010.  Indeed, in this quarter Labour matched the 
Conservatives, as both raced towards the statutory spending limit. The increase in 
donations was very much out of proportion to the party’s comeback in the polls.  The 
pattern of company donations seems to reflect quite closely that of other private 
donations to Labour.  There is little difference in the dynamics of general and 
company donations to the Labour party.  Labour party donations do not seem to 
reflect the party’s popularity, but overall donations increase as a general election 
approaches.  The unimportance of polls is difficult to interpret for a governing party.  
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It may demonstrate an ideological commitment to a party regardless of its future 
prospects of continuing in government or it may indicate a pragmatic concern to 
maintain good relations with a government regardless of its popularity.  However, two 
pieces of evidence tentatively point towards the greater importance of the ideological 
motivation.  Firstly, donations do increase as an election approaches.  Such donations 
are wasted if the government loses power.  Indeed, it is possible that a clear financial 
association with their competitors may earn the enmity of an incoming government.  
Of course, such a pattern also reflects the fact that parties fundraise more aggressively 
as elections approach.  Nonetheless, pragmatic businesses should be able to resist 
their approaches.  Secondly, Labour’s most successful quarter for company donations 
was just before an unpopular government was ejected from power in 2010.  Again, the 
most obvious interpretation is that these companies had an ideological preference for 
Labour. 
 
By contrast, the two types of donors seem to behave differently in contributing to the 
Conservative party.  Companies accounted for an average of 4.84 per cent of the 
quarterly private donations to the Labour Party, but 29 per cent of the quarterly 
private donations to the Conservatives.  In spite of companies’ much larger share of 
Conservative income, the correlation between company and other donations is much 
higher for the Labour party (0.8) than for the Conservatives (0.68).  Overall 
Conservative donations are quite strongly associated with the electoral timetable, but 
not the party’s popularity.  By contrast, company donations do not seem to be affected 
by the closeness of an election.  However, the figures suggest an intriguingly different 
reaction to the turning point provided by David Cameron’s election to the leadership 
of the party, with companies reacting immediately and very noticeably, while other 
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donors seemed to wait and, even then, contribute more cautiously.  Thus, it is more 
likely that Tory-supporting companies are more pragmatically motivated than other 
Tory supporting donors, or any Labour supporters.  Nonetheless, it is clear that 
companies donating to the Tories are not engaged in straightforward profit-seeking 
behaviour.  Obviously, company donations to the opposition Tories dwarfed those to 
the governing Labour party.  The most plausible interpretation is an interaction of 
ideological and pragmatic motivations.  Companies are not minded to contribute to 
the Tories simply to express a preference for a pro-business political agenda.  Instead, 
their willingness to spend money to support this ideological commitment depends on 
the electability of the Conservative party, as evidenced by the early company 





As already argued, there are many good reasons to suspect that very big businesses 
should behave differently to other companies.  Moreover, the study of large 
businesses provides methodological opportunities not available when researching the 
wider business sector.  In particular, the greater amount of available information and 
smaller number of businesses makes it easier to analyse firms at the individual level.  
It is also practical to study non-contributors as well as contributors, thereby avoiding 
the sample selection bias that affects so much of social science. 
 
I drew down a sample of the 1005 largest UK-registered enterprises in the FAME 
database as of July 2009.  This includes public and private companies as well as some 
partnerships.  This dataset is available at http://www.dcu.ie/~mcmenami. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
Forty four separately listed firms made 174 separate financial contributions, 
summarised in Table 3.  The table also reports payments to the Conservatives by 
individuals associated with the sample businesses.  If substantial cross ownership is 
taken into account this figure reduces to thirty seven.  These numbers are difficult to 
compare cross-nationally, due to differences in research design and, perhaps more 
critically, differences in disclosure regimes.  Nonetheless, it is clear that Britain is 
very different to Australia and the U.S.A where it is quite normal for large firms to 
regularly contribute to political parties and Canada where donations were normal until 
they were banned.  Britain’s big firms also seem less involved than those in Germany, 
where they play quite a marginal role.  Moreover, this data seems to confirm the 
common assumption that British parties have become less dependent on big business 
(c.f. Grant 1993: 142).  However, the tiny contribution rate provides a striking 
contrast to Bond’s study of Conservative donations between 1992 and 1996.  He 
reports annual contribution rates of between nine and twenty-eight per cent for the 
250 largest firms (Bond 2007: 65, 77).   
 
Nine businesses made payments to Labour and the Tories; twenty to Labour alone; 
seven to the Tories alone; five to the Liberal Democrats alone and one (Tesco PLC) to 
Labour and the Liberal Democrats.  No firm gave to both the Tories and the Liberal 
Democrats.  These figures suggest that the Tories were no longer the only party of big 
business in this period.  They had just over one third the numbers of exclusive 
supporters of Labour and only two more exclusive supporters than the Liberal 
Democrats.  However, a handful of Tory firms made relatively large numbers of 
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payments: KPMG LLP 22; FIL Investment Management 17 and Lewis Trust 15.  The 
next highest number of contributions was 11 by Northumbrian Water to Labour.  
Multivariate analysis can help us begin to understand the motivation behind these 
payments, by examining the timing of payments in relation to the electoral timetable 
and popularity of the parties, while controlling for the basic characteristics of the 
firms themselves. 
 
Table 4 presents a multinomial logit of big business payments to Labour and the 
Conservatives.  There is a monthly observation for each firm until the 2010 general 
election.  The dependent variable consists of three categories: non-contribution; 
contribution to Labour and contribution to the Conservatives.  The base category is 
non-contribution, so there are two equations: one computing the probability of 
contributing to Labour compared to non-contribution and one comparing the 
probability of contributing to the Conservatives to non-contribution.  The voting 
intention data comes from the ICM poll nearest to the middle of a given month.  The 
poll variable is the percentage reporting an intention to vote for Labour minus the 
percentage reporting an intention to vote for the Conservatives and ranges from a 
twenty point Conservative Lead to a twenty-three point Labour lead.  Pragmatic 
donors should give to the more popular party.  Time to Election assumes that a 
general election is due every five years and divides the number of days until the next 
election by one hundred.  Pragmatic donors should give to the government (i.e. 
Labour) when an election is distant and start to contribute to the opposition (i.e. the 
Conservatives) as the election approaches.  Turnover and sectoral data came from the 
FAME database.  However, some turnover figures had to be inter- or extrapolated and 
a very small number of companies were assigned sectoral codes by the author.  The 
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turnover figures have been logged to reduce the impact of outliers.  Larger firms, with 
their greater financial resources, should be more likely to contribute.  Sectors were 
coded according to the nine basic categories to the UK SIC 2003 classification, with 
sector one (fuel extraction, energy production and distribution, water supply) acting as 
the base category.  The type of business in which a firm is engaged should affect its 
contribution strategy, although it is difficult to find a straightforward theory to map 
different sectors on to the two parties. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results suggest that larger firms may be more likely to contribute to the Labour 
party but not to the Conservatives.  Manufacturing firms, outside of metal, 
engineering and vehicles, are more likely to contribute to Labour, while those in 
finance and business services are less likely.  Thus, the Labour equation fits the long-
established reputation of the party as being more sympathetic to manufacturing than 
the traditionally Conservative financial interests of the City of London.  Firms in the 
mineral extraction and chemicals, finance and business services and research and 
other services sectors are less likely to contribute to the Conservatives.  This equation 
does not support the supposed strong link between finance and the Conservative 
Party. The political variables can be used to draw inferences about the motivations of 
contributing businesses.  The Poll variable is almost one and a half times more 
negatively associated with contributions to the Conservatives than to Labour.  In other 
words, the more popular is Labour the less likely are firms to contribute to the 
Conservatives.  The negative coefficient for the number of days to the election is also 
three times bigger for Conservative contributions than it is for Labour contributions.  
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So, as an election draws nearer, firms are more likely to contribute to the opposition 
Conservatives.  The measurement of the Poll variable assumes that firms react very 
quickly to opinion polls.  Lagged values, which assume a slower reaction, produce 
broadly the same results.  The largest lagged value is for two months previous to the 
month of the contribution.  The lagged values affect the Conservative coefficient, but 
not that of Labour.  The Conservative poll coefficient for two months previous to the 
payment is thirty per cent larger than the relatively immediate value reported above.  
Such increases in the poll value tend to somewhat attenuate the effect of the number 
of days to the election.  Later lags continue to be statistically significant, but decline 
in power.  The variance explained by the models is low.  The equations do not provide 
a comprehensive explanation for business financing of parties, but they do illuminate 
the specific effect of political circumstances. 
 
Multinomial logits are difficult to interpret directly.  Therefore, I present some 
simulations to explore the substantive significance of the results.  These use the 
method of recycled predictions from the model above setting one variable at the same 
level across all observations and keeping all other variables at sample values.  Figure 
6 presents predictions for different values of the poll of voting intentions.  If the 
Conservatives hold a fifteen-point lead the model predicts a clear bias in business 
contributions towards the Conservatives.  However, if Labour leads by the same 
amount, the model predicts that business will treat the two parties virtually equally.  If 
there is no difference in the polls, a slightly higher probability of contribution to the 
Conservatives is predicted.  Figure 7 simulates different times in the electoral 
calendar.  If the election is imminent, the probability of contribution to the 
Conservatives is almost twice that of Labour.  However, if the election is distant, 
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contribution to the Labour government is more likely than to the Conservative 
opposition. 
[Figure 6 about here] 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
These simulations suggest an interaction of pragmatic and ideological motivations.  
Political donors amongst big British business tend to prefer the Conservatives.  Under 
no circumstance, does business decisively prefer the Labour party.  However, 
business only expresses its preference for the Conservatives under certain 
circumstances, namely an impending election or a Conservative lead in the opinion 
polls.  Ideologically, the Conservatives better represent a pro-business vision of 
Britain, but pragmatically, businesses are mindful of the power of a Labour 
government.  Interestingly, a very similar interaction can be observed in Australia 
(McMenamin 2008). American businesses also combine a preference for the right 
with pragmatic donations to both parties, although which comparisons are more 
difficult for regulatory and constitutional reasons (McMenamin 2010).  The 
contribution rate of the largest businesses is very low in comparison to Australian, 





It is possible that firms coordinate donations with senior figures associated with the 
business.  In this section, I test for that very possibility.  The data comes from all 
payments over £2000 (the lowest figure in the company data) to Conservative 
Campaign Headquarters (CCHQ) and its predecessor Conservative Central Office 
from individuals.  CCHQ received 32.25% of individual donations to the Tories and 
payments over £2000 to CCHQ consist of 29.74% of the total.  The name of every 
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contributor was researched to investigate whether they held a substantial number of 
shares or a senior position in any of the sample businesses at the time they made the 
payment.  Predictably, most were businesspeople of some sort; many possessed titles 
or honours and some had held elective or appointed offices in the Conservative party.  
The information on most such contributors came from a fairly narrow range of well-
known sources such as the Houses of Parliament themselves, the Sunday Times Rich 
List, Zoom Business Info, and Debrett’s.  A handful of the contributors were 
associated with more than one of the sample businesses and were assigned to the firm 
with which they were most prominently connected.  For example, Simon Robertson 
was a Director of HSBC, but chairman of Rolls Royce.   So, he is primarily associated 
with Rolls Royce. 
 
In no case did the Conservatives receive a contribution from a firm and from an 
individual prominently associated with that firm.   More big British businesses are 
associated with the Tories through the donations of their large individual shareholders 
and senior staff than through direct payments from the business itself.  However, 
these individuals made slightly fewer payments than did their businesses. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents two logit analyses of contributions to the Conservatives.  The 
dependent variable is coded one for contributions to the Conservatives and zero for 
non-contribution or contributions to the other parties.  Unsurprisingly, but 
reassuringly, the direct figures are very similar to those for the Conservative outcome 
in the multinomial logit presented in the previous section.  The equation for 
contributions to the Conservatives by individuals associated with sample firms is very 
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different.  The coefficient for poll is only four per cent the size of the equivalent in the 
direct sample.  The coefficient for days to election about seventy-two per cent of the 
size of its equivalent and reaches a very weak level of significance for such a large 
sample.  Thus, while there is evidence for pragmatism in direct donations by big 
businesses to the Conservatives, there is little or no evidence of pragmatism in 
donations by individuals associated with big businesses.  Since these individuals 
contribute to the opposition without regard to its popularity and pay no, or very little, 
heed to the electoral timetable it seems likely their motivation is ideological.  This is 
consistent with the American literature, which tends to show that individual donations 
are much more ideological than corporate donations (Burris 2001).  Thus, it seems 
that individual donations are just that.  They are not indirect donations by big 
businesses.  Although both are controversial, pragmatic donations are considered 
much more illegitimate than ideological donations.  Therefore, if businesses were to 
donate through individuals, in order to reduce visibility, we would expect that such 
donations would be more, not less pragmatic, than direct corporate donations.   
 
 
Conclusions and discussion 
 
The highly transparent and permissive nature of the current British system of political 
finance regulation provides an excellent opportunity for studying business financing 
of political parties.  The funding of British politics is heavily concentrated on the 
parties as organisations, rather than on candidates or officeholders.  Company funding 
is important to the Conservative Party but not to the Labour Party.  Indeed, without 
company funding the Conservatives would have had a considerably smaller income 
than the governing Labour Party over the last decade.  However, these aggregate 
figures should not lead us to conclude that company funding of British politics as a 
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purely ideological commitment to the Conservative Party.  Company donors to the 
Conservatives behave quite differently to other donors in that their donations seem to 
be influenced by the party’s electability.    This effect is particularly obvious in the 
donations of the largest British businesses, which split their donations evenly between 
the two parties when the Labour party controls government and holds a commanding 
lead in opinion polls.   
 
The importance of business funding to political competition is common to other 
liberal market economies, notably Australia and the United States, and under its 
previous regulatory regime, Canada.  In liberal market economies, the highly 
competitive, short-term focus of firms should generate substantial demand for private 
goods that could help firms develop an advantage over their rivals.  By contrast, in 
Germany’s co-ordinated market economy, business plays a much more marginal role 
in political finance, as businesses define and pursue their interests collectively through 
business associations.  The interaction of ideology and pragmatism is highly 
reminiscent of Australia and, to a lesser extent, the United States.  The preference for 
less state intervention, and the awareness of the state’s power to disrupt the business 
environment, is likely to engender a widespread awareness of the importance of 
public policy goods to the overall business sector.   Again like Australia and the 
United States, British business’s political donations reflect a clear division between 
the free-market right and a left concerned with social justice and social protection. 
 
However, British behaviour also differs strikingly from other liberal countries.  
Firstly, the bias towards the Conservatives is much greater than the bias towards the 
right in Australia and the United States.  Businesses make important contributions to 
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the finances of the Democrats and the Australian Labor Party, but New Labour has 
failed to attract serious financial support from businesses.  This is particularly striking 
given the Labour’s long period of governing from the centre of the ideological 
spectrum.  Secondly, while overall business funding remains important, all but a 
handful of the very largest businesses seem to have ceased funding the Conservatives 
since Labour took power.  This is rather tricky to interpret.  Contributing to a 
preferred party when in government, and abstaining when another party takes power, 
is a common strategy in other countries (McMenamin 2012).  If this is correct, more 
very large businesses should start to contribute now that the Tories have returned to 
power.  Alternatively, perhaps the ideological gap between the two parties has 
narrowed to the point where there is little ideological motivation for contributing.  If 
this is accurate, widespread donations should not re-emerge unless and until the 
parties begin to polarise again.  This interpretation sits uneasily with the continuing 
flow of business money to the Conservatives from outside the top one thousand.  
Nonetheless, in Britain, as elsewhere, it is usually assumed that smaller businesses 
have a stronger commitment to right-wing politics.  Finally, there might be a 
regulatory explanation.  Publicity and reputation are much more substantial costs for 
the largest businesses and payments by individual companies are now very easy to 
research.  Moreover, a number of controversies in the Labour era may have raised 
awareness of the costs of any political activity by big business (Hencke 2007; 
Wintour 2008; Booth 2009; Woolf, Milland and Watts, 2010).   Under this scenario, 
the withdrawal of big business from political finance is likely to be relatively 
permanent. The last difference between Britain and other liberal countries is the 
nature of the exchange between pragmatic contributors and parties.  In contemporary 
Australia (McMenamin 2008: 378-9) and the United States (Clawson, Neustadtl and 
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Weller 1998: 63-138), and in the past in Canada (McMenamin 2012), businesses have 
been able to purchase access to politicians.  In Britain there have been some cases of 
the sale of access by individual politicians (Ivens 2009; Watt 2009; Groves 2010), but 
the parties and the government do not seem to have been involved.  A discrete 
exchange like the sale of access is unlikely to explain most of the pragmatically-timed 
Conservative donations.  Instead, perhaps such payments sought a reciprocal 
exchange of money now for a possible policy benefit in the future (McMenamin 
2012).  Another possibility is that British pragmatism is aimed at the avoidance of 
costs rather than the pursuit of benefits.  Perhaps large businesses have desisted from 
donating to the Conservative party in order to avoid some form of punishment from 
the Labour government.  The recent change of government provides an opportunity 
for students of British and comparative politics to probe these questions using both 




Appendix: Loans and British Political Finance 
 
Figure A1 demonstrates that the Conservatives have been more dependent on loans 
than Labour.  This is hardly surprising given that they have been in opposition for all 
of the relevant period and have been an unpopular opposition for most of that time.  
While the commercial basis for loans from banks is obvious, the motivation for the 
loans by other companies and by individuals is more mysterious.  The sources of the 
loans are very different for the two parties.  Labour received several seven-figure 
loans from individuals.  These are the loans that were the subject of the “loans-for-
peerages” controversy, which led to the police questioning prime minister Tony Blair 
as a witness.  Labour borrowed virtually all remaining money from retail banks.  By 
contrast, the Conservatives’ largest borrowings were from financial institutions, with 
substantial loans from both retail banks and more specialised private banks and other 
financial services firms.  Officially, the Tories also borrowed almost seven million 
from other businesses.  However, most of this seems to have been a (legal) way of 
trying to preserve the anonymity of large donations by wealthy individuals (Doward 
2008).  Even if these loans are reclassified, the Conservatives were much more 
dependent on loans from financial institutions than Labour.  The Conservatives have 
already repaid the vast majority of the money they borrowed – seventy seven per cent.  
The situation is different for Labour, which has paid back only forty-three per cent of 
the money borrowed.  The difference between amounts borrowed and repaid is 
relatively small for business loans.  The low rate of repayment of individual loans to 
Labour is the chief reason for this difference between the two parties.  Of course, 
these statistics do not take into account the terms, interest rates or financial situations 
of the parties.  Indeed, a handful of large loans may have been paid back precisely 
because it was suspected that they were disguised donations.  Regression analyses 
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(not shown) suggest that there was no relationship between loans and the electoral 
timetable and the standing of the parties in the polls.  In other words, these loans are 
unlikely to be disguised pragmatic donations.  Instead, they are likely to be normal 
commercial loans or a variety of ideological donation to the parties. 
 
Within the sample of very large businesses, only banks have made loans to the parties.  
Therefore, it seems very unlikely that the loans were attempts to disguise donations.  
HSBC and Lloyds made small loans to both parties.  During the sample period the 
Co-operative Bank made 10 loans to the Labour party, totalling over 5.5 million.1  
The Conservative party received no large loans from sample firms.  Its biggest debt of 
18.5 million was incurred to Irish bank, AIB in 2006. 
 
The principal parties have also received major loans from individuals associated with 
very large businesses.  There is only one such lender for the Conservatives: Lord 
Laidlaw of Rothiernay lent three and a half million, most of which was converted to a 
donation.  The size of the loans, and their clear bias towards the government, suggest 
that there may have been a pragmatic motivation behind the loans.  Nonetheless, these 
loans seem more likely to have been a personal pursuit of honours rather than a way 
of pursuing a business interest, while evading disclosure regulations.   
[Figure A1 about here] 
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REGRESSION ANALYSES OF DONATIONS (£s) TO THE CONSERVATIVES 
Private donations Company donations 
 b coefficient robust S.E. b coefficient robust S.E. 
Poll (percent) 80.27 65.53 35.47 18.94 
Days to 
election -3.32 1.29 * -.28 .37 
Constant 7512.16 1198.93** 1521.57 374.87** 
F 12.64** 7.14** 
R² 0.35 0.21 
Observations 38 38 








REGRESSION ANALYSES OF DONATIONS (£s) TO LABOUR 
Private donations Company donations 
 b coefficient robust S.E. b coefficient robust S.E. 
Poll (percent) 12.57 38.13 2.61 3.32 
Days to 
election -2.03* .95 -.17 .09 
Constant 6129.47 1098.52 369.11 98.34 
F 3.11 2.13 
R² 0.23 0.17 
Observations 38 38 





DONATIONS BY VERY LARGE FIRMS 
 Payments Businesses Individuals 
Labour 72 29 NA 
Liberal Democrats 11 6 NA 
Conservatives 91 17 NA 
Conservatives  







MULTINOMIAL LOGIT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO LABOUR AND THE CONSERVATIVES 
 b coefficient robust S.E.  
clustered by business 
Labour  
Poll (percent) -.04 .01** 
Turnover (logged) .44 .26 
Time to Election -.04 .03 
Mineral extraction, chemicals .10 1.25 
Metal goods, etc. 1.58 .96 
Other manufacturing 1.93 .98* 
Construction 1.21 .95 
Wholesale, retail, etc. 1.05 .98 
Transport & communication .13 .90 
Finance, business services -32.64 .83*** 
Research, other services 1.32 1.27 
Constant -14.40 4.06*** 
Conservatives  
Poll (percent) -.06 .02*** 
Turnover (logged) -.10 .13 
Time to Election -.09 .04** 
Mineral extraction, chemicals -33.00 .67*** 
Metal goods, etc. -.18 1.19 
Other manufacturing .86 .84 
Construction .73 1.01 
Wholesale, retail, etc. .75 1.15 
Transport & communication 1.28 .98 
Finance, business services -34.12 .62*** 
Research, other services -34.04 .68*** 
Constant -5.79 1.95** 
Observations 125625 
Businesses 1005 
Log pseudolikelihood -1257.52 
Wald chi² 26522.05*** 
Pseudo R²        0.064 
Notes: The base category for the dependent variable is non-contribution.  The base category for the sectoral 
dummies is extraction of fuels, fuel processing and production. There were two cases in which a firm 
contributed to both Labour and Conservatives in one month.  In both cases, the larger donation was to the 
Conservatives, so these have been coded as Conservative contributions in the analysis above. Note: *= 
significant at 5%; **=significant at 1%; ***-significant at 0.1% 
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TABLE 5 











Poll (percent) .00 .02 -.06 .02*** 
Turnover (logged) .37 .28 -.10 .13 
Time to Election  -.07   .04  -.09  .04** 
Mineral extraction, chemicals .52 .89 dropped dropped 
Metal goods, etc. -1.13  1.11 -.18  1.19 
Other manufacturing  .27 1.11 .85  .84 
Construction .56 .65 .73  1.01 
Wholesale, retail, etc. .16 .70 .75  1.15 
Transport & communication .39 .74  1.28 .98 
Finance, business services  .40  1.08   dropped dropped 
Research, other services dropped dropped dropped dropped 
Constant -12.22   4.19** -5.79   1.95** 
Observations  120875 106750 
Businesses 967 854 
Log pseudolikelihood  -662.911  -696.31 
Wald chi²  24.70**  107.67*** 
Pseudo R²        0.026  0.052 
Notes: The base category for the dependent variable is non-contribution or contribution to one of the other parties.  
The base category for the sectoral dummies is extraction of fuels, fuel processing and production. Sectors in 
which no firm contributed have been dropped. Note: *= significant at 5%; **=significant at 1%; ***-significant at 





































































































Election 2001 Election 2005 Election 2010
Donations Conservative Lead
 
Source: Author’s analysis of quarterly data from the UK Electoral Commission Political Finance 
Register.  Public funds, received by the opposition Conservatives, but not the governing Labour party, 



































































Election 2001 Election 2005 Election 2010
Donations Conservative Lead
 




































































Election 2001 Election 2005 Election 2010
Donations Labour lead
 
Source: Author’s analysis of quarterly data from the UK Electoral Commission Political Finance 






























































Election 2001 Election 2005 Election 2010
Donations Labour lead
 

















Conservatives lead by 15 No difference in the polls Labour leads by 15
Mean probability of contribution to Labour
Mean probability of contribution to the Conservatives
 


















100 days to general election 1600 days to general election
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